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NOTES
RESERVATION OF RIGHTS TO PERSONAL JURISDICTION
Plaintiff sued in city court for specific performance of an
alleged sale of jewelry. Service of citation was made on the
defendant's mother, with whom he had lived prior to his mar-
riage. The deputy assumed that the Mrs. Sauviac who answered
the door was defendant's wife. However, defendant and his wife
had established their marital domicile elsewhere. Defendants
filed declinatory exceptions of insufficiency of service of process,
improper citation, and lack of jurisdiction over the person, along
with their answer denying liability. They then filed a recon-
ventional demand reserving their rights under the exceptions.
The trial court subsequently overruled the exceptions, holding
defendant's reconventional demand an appearance sufficient to
waive the declinatory exceptions. Defendants appealed, claiming
that they did not, by filing a reconventional demand, place them-
selves properly before the court so as to waive declinatory ex-
ception rights which were specifically reserved. Held, the filing
of a reconventional demand constitutes an implied waiver of
the exception to jurisdiction. An express reservation of rights
does not avoid a waiver. Judgment was awarded to defendant
on the merits. Mexic Brother, Inc. v. Sauviac, 191 So.2d 873 (La.
App. 4th Cir. 1966).
Article 50021 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that in
city court an answer and all exceptions must be filed simultan-
eously or the exceptions are waived. The court ruled that this
case was not within the provision of article 5002,2 and that the
issue of whether an exception to personal jurisdiction is waived
by the filing of a reconventional demand, when rights are spe-
cifically reserved, would be decided in light of the general pro-
visions applicable to proceedings in district courts.
Prior to 1936 it was well settled, based on common law prin-
1. Dilatory and declinatory exceptions may be filed simultaneously
without a waiver of the objection to personal jurisdiction. LA. CODE O' Civu.
PROCEDURE arts. 925, 928 (1960). No peremptory exception or answer may be
filed simultaneously with the declinatory exception urging the objection to
personal jurisdiction without a waiver of the declinatory exception. Id. art. 7.
This same article provides that when a defendant files a declinatory excep-
tion urging lack of personal jurisdiction, the filing of a dilatory exception,
a peremptory exception, or an answer "when required by law" does not con-
stitute a waiver of the declinatory exception. City courts are one instance
in which this is required by law. Id. art. 5002: "A defendant shall incor-
porate in his answer all of the exceptions on which he intends to rely."
2. Id. arts. 1003, 1031, 1032. On the basis of these articles, the court
decided that a reconventional demand is not an exception, or an answer,
or an affirmative defense which is required to be a part of the answer. It
is an incidental demand which may be incorporated In the answer.
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ciples,3 that the exception to the citation or to personal jurisdic-
tion was waived if the defendant appeared for any purpose other
than to make his exception. This general rule included the filing
of dilatory or peremptory exceptions 4 or other pleadings 5 simul-
taneously with the exception to the jurisdiction.
If an exception to personal jurisdiction is overruled, this ob-
jection is not waived by subsequently going to trial on the merits
if proper steps are taken to except to the ruling on the juris-
dictional issue and to reserve one's rights.0 This position is in
accord with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and a majority
of states. The theory underlying this rule is that it would be
unfair to a defendant who has good defenses both to the juris-
diction and to the merits to require him to waive one for the
other, and also, that such a rule avoids multiple trials and ap-
peals.T
Even prior to 1936, the contention had been advanced that
declinatory exceptions filed simultaneously with other plead-
ings would be preserved if rights were expressly reserved. But
in the 1918 case of True Tag Paint v. Wellman,8 the court held
3. 4 C.J. Appearance § 3, at 1316 (1916).
4. State ex rel. Brenner v. Noe, 186 La. 102, 171 So. 708 (1936); Martel
Syndicate v. Block, 154 La. 869, 98 So. 400 (1923) (exception ratione personae
was coupled with one ratione mater4ae in same plea); Bank of Selma v.
Walker, 130 La. 810, 58 So. 580 (1912); State v. Buck, 46 La. Ann. 656, 15
So. 531 (1894); Standard Indem. Inc. v. Albrought, 81 So.2d 448 (La. App.
1st Cir. 1955); Dauterive v. Sternfels, 164 So. 349 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1935)
(peremptory exceptions urging the objection of no cause of action filed with
declinatory exception objecting to jurisdiction constitutes a waiver of the
objection to jurisdiction); City of New Orleans v. Walker, 23 La. Ann. 803
(1871) (defendant appeared for purpose of objecting to the jurisdiction of
the court and at the same time entered a plea of Us pendens).
5. Stanley v. Jones, 197 La. 627, 2 So.2d 45 (1941) (defendant's appear-
ance in suit to obtain extension of time within which to plead amounted
to a general appearance); Adams v. Ross Amusement Co., 182 La. 252, 161
So.601 (1935) (intervenors who appeared and invoked jurisdiction of the
court to be declared owners of the attached property and have attachment
dissolved submitted to the court's jurisdiction); Stringfellow v. Nowlin
Bros., 157 La. 683, 102 So. 869 (1925); Blanks v. Lephiew, 132 La. 545, 61 So.
615 (1913) (nonresident defendants, by filing a demand in reconvention,
subjected themselves to court's jurisdiction); True Tag Paint Co. v. Well-
man, 142 La. 1038, 78 So. 109 (1918) (answer to merits filed simultaneously
with objection to citation); Heard v. Patton, 27 La. Ann. 542 (1875) (defen-
dant objected to service, but exception contained a plea which amounted to
an answer).
6. Snyder v. Davison, 172 La. 274, 134 So. 89 (1931); Davis v. Lewis &
Lewis, 60 So.2d 230 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1952); Spearman v. Stover, 170 So.
259 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1936).
7. See Annot., 62 A.L.R.2d 939-41 (1958).
8. 142 La. 1038, 1041, 78 So. 109, 110 (1918), the defendant, reserving rights
under the exception, filed an answer. The court ruled: "Defendant stated
in the exception that he appeared for the sole purpose of the exception,
and In the answer he stated that he filed the answer only on condition that
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that a reservation of rights would not effect a deviation from the
general rule-rights under the exception were still deemed
waived.
The 1936 amendment to the Code of Practice provided that
all dilatory and declinatory exceptions were to be pleaded at the
same time." State v. Younger'0 settled the question of whether
rights under the exception to jurisdiction over the person could
be reserved, as far as dilatory exceptions were concerned. It was
firmly established in the jurisprudence that all dilatory excep-
tions could be pleaded at once without a waiver resulting, if they
were pleaded in the alternative." However, as held in Garig
Transfer v. Harris,2 and subsequent cases, 13 failure to plead
the exception be overruled, and with full reserve of the exception; but the
statement that defendant appeared for the sole purpose of the exception
was contradicted by the fact that he appeared also for the purpose of the
answer, since he did as a matter of fact file the answer. It [the exception]
was properly overruled."
9. La. Code of Practice art. 333 (1870), as amended, La. Acts 1936, No.
124, § 1: "Hereafter no dilatory exception shall be allowed in any case after
a judgment by default has been taken; and in every case they must be
pleaded in limine lits and at one and the same time; otherwise they shall
not be admitted; nor shall such exceptions hereafter be allowed in any
answer in any cause."
Id. art. 331 provides that "there are two principal species of exceptions;
some are dilatory, others peremptory. Dilatory exceptions are divided into
declinatory and those simply called dilatory." The court interpreted the 1936
amendment as including all dilatory exceptions-both declinatory and dila-
tory.
10. 206 La. 1037, 1041-42, 20 So.2d 305, 306 (1944). The defendant in this
case wanted to object to the jurisdiction of the court and plead certain
dilatory exceptions. Under prior jurisprudence by doing this he would
have waived the declinatory exception. The Supreme Court approved of
his pleading the declinatory exception first, and then in the alternative,
and with reservation of all rights under the first exception, his plead-
ing of the dilatory exception. The court declared: "An exception to the juris-
diction of the court is a declinatory exception and is one of the two prin-
cipal species of exceptions designated as dilatory exceptions. . . .All of the
exceptions filed being dilatory in their nature, relator was required to plead
them at the same time under the provisions of Act 124 of 1936 amending
and re-enacting article 333 of the Code of Practice. It is inconceivable that
relator should be held as waiving his exception to the jurisdiction of the
court when he filed the other exceptions with full reservation of rights and
without submitting to the jurisdiction of the court, thus doing no more than
he was required to do." For discussion of State v. Younger, see McMahon,
The Work of the Louisiana Court for the 1954-1955 Terms--Civil Procedure,
16 LA. L. REV. 361, 364 (1956); Comment, 11 LA. L. REv. 366, 374-75 (1951);
Note, 19 TUL. L. REV. 460 (1945).
11. Cameron v. Reserve Ins. Co., 237 La. 433, 111 So.2d 336 (1959); Davis
v. Lewis & Lewis, 60 So.2d 230 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1952); Morales v. Falcon,
167 So. 109 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1936), discussed in Comment, 1 LA. L. REV. 174
(1938).
12. 226 La. 117, 132, 75 So.2d 28, 34 (1954): "In the Younger case, unlike
the case at bar, the exceptions were filed only in the alternative with full
reservation of and without waiving his exception to the jurisdiction of the
court-here they were submitted together without reservation."
13. Mitchell v. Gulf States Fin. Corp., 226 La. 1001, 78 So.2d 3 (1955);
Dupre v. Consolidated Underwriters, 99 So.2d 522 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1957).
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dilatory exceptions in the alternative, though a reservation of
rights under the exception to personal jurisdiction was included,
meant a waiver of the declinatory exception.
No affirmative statement has been made in the jurispru-
dence concerning peremptory exceptions, but it appears that
peremptory exceptions can be filed simultaneously without a
waiver resulting if rights are properly reserved. 14 On the other
hand, the court stated affirmatively in Cameron v. Reserve In-
surance Co., 15 "[W]e conclude that the third party defendant's
filing of an exception to the jurisdiction ratione personae6 with
full reservation of his rights and the filing of his answer at the
same time did not constitute a waiver of the jurisdiction."' 7
The Code of Civil Procedure specifies certain exceptions to
the general principle that the seeking of any relief constitutes
a waiver of the exception to personal jurisdiction. 8 The court
14. See Commercial Credit Corp. v. Carrier, 139 So.2d 256, 259 (La. App.
1st Cir. 1962): "In this case the defendant did not plead the exception of
no cause or right of action in the alternative with full reservation of his
rights. Therefore the exception to the jurisdiction must be overruled.";
Standard Indem. Inc. v. Albrought, 81 So.2d 448 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1955)
(the declinatory exception objecting to jurisdiction was deemed waived
when a peremptory exception was filed with it; but the court emphasized
that the peremptory exception was filed without reserving rights under the
declinatory exception). Thus it appears that if rights under the exception
had been reserved, they would not have been waived.
15. 237 La. 433, 111 So.2d 336 (1959). But see The Work of the Louisiana
Supreme Court for the 1958-1959 Term-Civil Procedure, 20 LA. L. REV. 298,
302 (1960), for a discussion of Dean McMahon's disagreement with this de-
cision.
16. This was in reality an objection to venue, since the place where the
action was to be brought was objected to. However, common law venue
seems substantially equivalent to jurisdiction ratione personae and these
were used interchangeably by the courts prior to the adoption of the new
Code of Civil Procedure. See Comment, 12 LA. L. REV. 210 (1952); Note,
12 LA. L. REV. 503 (1952).
Venue and objection to personal jurisdiction are the same for purposes
of the present discussion, since they are both urged under the same type
of exception. LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE art. 925 (1960): "The objections
which may be raised through the declinatory exception include, but are not
limited to the following: ... improper venue; the court's lack of juris-
diction over the person of defendant .... "
17. Cameron v. Reserve Ins. Co., 237 La. 433, 455, 111 So.2d 336, 344
(1959), on rehearing.
18. LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE art. 7 (1960): "Except as otherwise pro-
vided in this article, a party makes a general appearance which subjects
him to the jurisdiction of the court and impliedly waives all objections
thereto when, either personally or through counsel he seeks any relief other
than: (1) entry or removal of the name of an attorney or counsel of record
(2) extension of time within which to plead (3) security for costs (4) dis-
solution of an attachment issued on the ground of non-residence of the de-
fendant. When a defendant files a declinatory exception which includes a
prayer for the dismissal of action on the ground that the court has no
jurisdiction over him, the pleading of other objections therein, the filing
of the dilatory exception therewith, or the filing of the peremptory excep-
NOTES
reasoned in the instant case that since any refernce to a recon-
ventional demand was omitted from article 7 of the Code of
Civil Procedure, 19 the filing of one with an exception to the juris-
diction constituted a waiver. 20 The court further declared that
the defendant's reservation of rights under the exception did not
prevent the waiver from taking place, basing its decision on
True Tag Paint v. Wellman.21
It is submitted that since True Tag Paint was decided in
1918, the court should have applied the reasoning of the subse-
quent cases on the subject. 22 As this is a request for affirmative
relief, it differs materially from cases where the matter is one
of defense. In federal court,2 3 it appears that even a claim for
affirmative relief may be joined with an objection of lack of
personal jurisdiction without waiving that exception.24 The re-
sult of allowing a reconventional demand to be pleaded with a
declinatory exception of lack of personal jurisdiction with rights
properly reserved would enable more rapid disposition of liti-
gation and avoid multiple trials and appeals. It is submitted
that the ends of justice would have been better served in the
instant case by finding no waiver of the exception to jurisdiction
over the person when the defendant has filed a reservation of
his rights with a subsequent reconventional demand.
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tion or an answer thereto when required by law does not constitute a
general appearance."
19. See note 17 supra.
20. See note 5 supra.
21. See note 8 supra.
22. See notes 14 and 15 supra.
23. See Annot., 62 A.L.R.2d 939 (1958).
24. See Investors Royalty Co. v. Market Trend Survey, Inc., 206 F.2d
108 (10th Cir. 1953); Keil Lock Co. v. Earle Hardware Mfg. Co., 16 F.R.D.
388 (D.C.N.Y. 1954); Johnson v. Fire Ass'n of Philadelphia, 240 Mo. App.
1187, 225 S.W.2d 370 (1949).
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